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Abstract— In response to the criticism and scant discussion 
of judicial decision-making in Islamic jurisprudence this paper 
analyzes the judicial decision-making of the jurists on Shari’ah 
Supervisory Boards. First the paper provides a background into 
Islamic banking and the legal framework of the Shari’ah. Second 
paper examines two methods of judicial-decision making, 
legalism and the economic theory, as applied to Islamic jurists. 
Although viewed as distinct theories, I argue that the holistic 
nature of the Shari’ah inevitably weaves the two methods 
together. Finally, the paper calls for a broader discussion on 
whether Western theories of judicial decision-making, and 
therefore concepts of legal realism, should be used to analyze 
Islamic jurists. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION:  AN OVERVIEW OF THE SHARI‟AH AND 
ISLAMIC BANKING 
This paper aims to establish a framework and begin a 
dialogue for understanding, analyzing, and predicting the 
judicial decision-making process regulating the Islamic 
banking industry. The Islamic banking industry‟s estimated 
value is over a trillion dollars and has been growing ten percent 
per year since the 1990‟s [20]. Yet Islamic banking practices 
are almost entirely regulated by a select group of jurists and 
judicial institutions that decide whether or not a financial 
product, transaction, or contract is lawful under the Shari‟ah 
[20] [48]. Generally these decisions are in the form of a single 
fatwa, or judicial opinion.  
It is my understanding that the judicial decision-making 
of these private jurists is highly legalistic, and that a legalist 
method is the best way to assess and predict judicial outcomes. 
However I will make an attempt at critical analysis by 
exploring the economic theory of judicial decision-making and 
discussing the need for social-science based approaches 
founded on empirical research, as there are social and 
psychological factors that may influence rulings. While this 
article is written primarily for those seeking a deeper 
understanding of judicial decision-making in Islamic banking, 
there is also secondary purpose to the article that seeks to 
begin a constructive dialogue among scholars of Islamic 
jurisprudence
1
 as to whether or not a critical analysis of 
modern Islamic judicial decision-making is necessary, helpful, 
or even appropriate.  
 
A. Why the Study of Judicial Decision-Making in Islamic 
Jurisprudence Regarding Banking and Finance is Important. 
 
Thus far the study of Islamic banking and finance law by 
Western and most Islamic scholars has focused primarily on 
“what” is and is not permissible under the Shari’ah. However 
there has been little research in regards to the “how” and 
“why” jurists are reaching these outcomes and the process that 
takes them to their legal conclusion. If there is something 
other then a legalistic approach being used the question 
becomes how big an influence is it and whether or not other 
approaches should be discussed among practitioners of, and 
actors in, the world of Islamic banking law.  
If not adopted as a form of national governance, like in 
Saudi Arabia, the Shari’ah is binding on only those who 
accept it [12] [9].
2
 For the most part it is up to the individual, 
or bank, to regulate his or her own actions in accordance with 
the Shari’ah. So while Islamic banks may operate globally 
they are expected that to follow religious guidelines of the 
Shari’ah even when engaging in business within secular 
nations [35]. This concept expands the jurisdiction and role of 
the jurist in Islamic banking, making the study of his judicial 
decision-making process all the more important. It also 
increases the importance of studying Islamic jurisprudence in 
Western law schools
3
 because Islamic financial products, and 
the contracts that accompany them may begin to appear more 
frequently in Western litigation following the recent political 
shifts in the Middle East [35]. 
                                                          
1 Jurisprudence is the “process by means of which jurists derive 
sets of guidelines rules and regulations Islamic from the 
principles of the Qur‟an and the Sunnah” [22]. 
2 Al-Fahad discusses Saudi‟s adoption of Hanbali fiqh under a 
strict, now loosened, “Wahhabi” interpretation. 
3 “As Professor W. M. Ballantyne notes, „Even where the Shari'a 
is not applied in current practice, there could be a reversion to it 
in any particular case. Without doubt, knowledge of the Shari'a 
will become increasingly important for practitioners, not only in 
Saudi Arabia, but in the other Muslim jurisdictions‟” [35]. 
Spencer J. Coopchik, Esq.
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Although research leads me to believe that the legalist 
method is the primary form of judicial decision-making, 
testing the other models of judicial decision-making remains 
relevant as a means of supporting my initial belief. Therefore I 
am suggesting a dialogue as to whether other approaches, 
including economic models, applied by scholars studying 
decision-making of United State‟s federal judges should be 
applied to Islamic jurists who regulate the Islamic financial 
market [15].
4
 Because the role of the jurist in both legal realms 
is essentially the same, (as in both types of jurists decide what 
is and is not lawful conduct within the confines of the law) it 
is possible that other theories used to analyze judicial 
decision-making through social sciences may also be 
applicable in understanding and predicting Islamic judicial 
decisions. This is important for numerous reasons, principally 
because the Islamic banking industry is continuously growing 
and intends on expanding its cliental basis to religious 
Muslims in secular Western nations reaching a projected 
worth of four trillion dollars [20] [13]. Unfortunately, 
businesses and investors dislike the degree of uncertainty 
caused by the jurist‟s ability to reconsider rulings [48]. 
Therefore in order to create more confidence in the Islamic 
market it is crucial that judicial decisions regarding financial 
products are predictable, stable, and representative of future 
decisions on similar legal issues [48].  
In order to illustrate this point I will provide an example 
of how a single and unforeseen judicial decision by a 
prominent jurist can create a shift in the Islamic market place. 
 
In November 2007, an Islamic finance scholar, 
Sheikh Muhammad Taqi Usmani, questioned 
whether the issuance of sukuk
5
 was technically in 
compliance with the fundamental prohibition against 
interest. Usmani stated in a policy paper, “The time 
has come to revisit this matter, and rid sukuk of these 
blemishes.” These “blemishes” include, among other 
things, the now-common practice of marketing asset-
backed returns on the basis of the LIBOR rate 
benchmark, which is a “corruption” according to 
Usmani… Up to the time that Usmani released this 
statement, sukuk had been considered the backbone 
of Islamic finance and had allowed the system to 
grow and expand into more traditional investment 
arenas. 
                                                          
4 In his research, Baum reviews legal, attitudinal, and strategic 
models. 
5 “Sukuk are investment certificates. Sometime they represent 
„ownership‟ in the assets underlying the issue. Those with 
variable returns are based on mudarabah or musharakah. More 
popular are those with pre-determined, fixed incomes. The 
simplest of these is the one based on ijarah, i.e., lease or hire. A 
building (or an oil tanker) is purchased and rented out, the 
money capital for the purchase having been mobilized by selling 
certificates. Owners of these certificates would be entitled to 
receive a portion of the rent income” [52]. 
After Usmani‟s pronouncement, sukuk issuances 
dropped off dramatically. While many acknowledge 
that at least some of this decline may be attributed to 
the overall decline of worldwide financial markets, it 
is likely that Usmani‟s comments also contributed to 
the trend. Commentators, scholars, and investors 
were widely surprised and alarmed by how a single 
speech could set back progress and investment in a 
product that had proven so successful in recent years 
[48]. 
6
 
 
The example above demonstrates the need to study and 
understand the decision-making process as well as the 
influences and motivations on this select group of jurists and 
judicial institutions. Understanding how Sheikh Usmani 
reached his decision regarding sukuk can be best analyzed 
through the legalist method as applied in Islamic 
jurisprudence, which I will lay out later in the paper. However 
one may also try and look at the Sheikh‟s decision through 
other means of critical analysis, like the economic method, to 
find possible motivators for the timing of the opinion. In order 
to present those methods of judicial decision-making it is 
important that the reader understand the basics of the 
Shari’ah, Islamic banking, and the jurists regulating the trade. 
B. The Shari’ah Generally 
First, a disclaimer. This is a very broad and simplistic 
overview of a fourteen hundred year old legal tradition that 
encompasses all the earthy and divine aspects of an 
individual‟s life [22]. This section is intended to give the 
reader a basic overview of the Shari’ah in order to 
comprehend latter analysis of the legalist method in Islamic 
jurisprudence. Moreover I will focus only on Sunni legal 
tradition and schools simply because Islamic banks governed 
by Sunni Islamic jurisprudence and jurists are more prevalent 
[33] [35].
7
  Further research is suggested to those interested in 
the specific mechanisms of the Shari’ah mentioned here, as no 
single article could sufficiently articulate the workings of any 
legal system [16].  
Shari’ah is can be translated in two ways: first, religiously 
as “God‟s eternal immutable will for humanity,” a Divine law 
encompassing all the spiritual and the mundane, and second 
by as “Islamic law.”8 The former is more appropriate because 
while the Shari’ah is often legal in nature it sees a sacred 
component to all actions taken throughout ones existence and 
therefore all actions, including contracts or financial 
transactions, are subject to religious legal analysis and 
                                                          
6 Sheikh Usmani‟s full opinion can be, and should be, 
downloaded from his website [53] for a better understanding of 
sukuk and the jurists role in the Islamic finance market. 
7 In this regard, Kettell cites [18]. 
8 The Oxford Dictionary of Islam, unlike Christian legal 
traditions Islam see‟s no separation between the sacred and the 
profane, all acts are encompassed and categorized under the 
Shari’ah [26].  
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categorization [33]. Contrary to the Western idea of an 
“Islamic Law” the Shari’ah is not codified, nor is there a 
singular vision on the various legal subjects within it [41]. For 
the purposes of this article, and in order to avoid more 
complex theological issues, this article will refer to the 
Shari’ah as a holistic Islamic law given by God and 
exemplified through his Prophet Muhammad as understood by 
scholars and jurists and applied in Islamic societies throughout 
history. Implementation, understanding, and development of 
the Shari’ah has differed over time and often changes in 
various regions of the world [51]. Like other legal traditions 
there are different schools of thought, legal theories, and 
“splits in the Courts” so to speak.  
Despite the perceived rigidity of religious law, individuals 
or institutions who choose the path of the Shari’ah have some 
leeway in following the law as it is often the case that 
differing judicial opinions will create areas where stricter or 
loser observance of a particular rule are both equally valid 
[12]. This is not to suggest that Islamic jurist decide 
“arbitrarily” as orientalists and a Supreme Court justice have 
suggested [47],
9
 but rather that there is the possibility of 
having differing yet equally valid legal rules on a particular 
issue [12]. The concepts of pluralism and public choice, 
described by Liaquat Ali Khan as elements of the “free-
markets” of Islamic jurisprudence will be discussed later as 
possible influences on the judicial decision-making process 
[12] [28].  
Differing opinions are often caused by the fact that jurists 
in different regions may study legal theory under different 
schools of law [12]. In Sunni Islamic Jurisprudence there are 
four main schools of law that were developed in the early 
eighth and ninth centuries [51]. These four schools or 
madhhabs (literally paths) are still predominant today and the 
early treatises of their founders are often cited as theoretical 
basis in fatwas
10
 regarding Islamic Banking [46]. The four 
schools are Hanafi, Maliki, Hanbali, and Shafi’i named after 
the founding jurist [31]. For the most part the schools agree on 
nearly every major aspect of the Shari’ah, however, despite 
reaching similar legal conclusions, their legal theories and 
methods of interpretation differ.
11
 It is often the case that one 
                                                          
9 “Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 11 (1949) (Frankfurter, 
J., dissenting). In reference to Justice Frankfurter referring to an 
Islamic jurist deciding arbitrarily beneath a tree. “Frankfurter's 
imagery undoubtedly was inspired by the judicial archetypes 
devised by Max Weber, who described uncontrolled judicial 
discretion as “kadi justice”” [47]. Kadi‟s or Qadi‟s are Islamic 
Jurists appointed to a State judgeship and were inaccurately 
portrayed by Orientalists as arbitrary decision makers.  
10 I am aware that “Fatawa” is the proper Arabic plural, 
however in order to create ease and limit confusion I opted for 
an Anglicized plural where the “s” creates distinction more 
noticeable to Western readers.     
11 “Over time, the legal methods and conclusions of the most 
influential scholars evolved into distinct schools of thought. 
Because Muslims never created a formal church, Islamic legal 
school of law is predominant in a region; such rules and 
theories of one school are preferred over the other schools. For 
example the law of Saudi Arabia is entirely based on Hanbali 
fiqh, or substantive law [9].  
1) Fiqh 
The Western idea of an Islamic law is better expressed 
through the term fiqh. Fiqh is the substantive aspect of the 
Shari’ah in which clear legal rules are formed and derived 
from the Shari’ah sources, and unlike the Shari’ah, fiqh is 
mutable [26]. Fiqh is the Shari’ah as understood and declared 
by the jurists and therefore it is fallible [26] [47]. It is the 
“science of the Shari’ah” and contains judicial articulations of 
the law set forth by God and the Prophet [33]. The 
categorizations of lawful and unlawful acts are most easily 
found in the volumes of fiqh written by jurists and legal 
scholars rather then the Shari’ah sources like the Qur‟an 
where rules are more ambiguous [47] [30]. Fiqh should not be 
confused with siyasa, or state legislation [51] [46].
 
 
Under the Shari’ah all actions fall under five categories: 
1.) Wajib- an obligatory duty, the omission of which is 
prohibited and punishable [33].  2.) Mustahab- an action that 
is rewarded or recommended but omission of which is not 
prohibited or punishable [33].  3.) Mubah- a permissible act of 
which the Shari’ah is indifferent [33]. 4.) Makruh- an act that 
is disliked and should be avoided; avoidance of the act is 
rewarded but commission of it is not prohibited or punishable 
[33]. 5.) Haram- an action that is prohibited and intentional 
commission of the act is punishable [33]. Categories one 
through four are halal, meaning they are lawful (or 
permissible) even if disliked, unless it is wajib where omission 
of an act is unlawful. It is the role of the jurist to define which 
financial products or transactions are halal and which are 
haram under the Shari’ah.  
While the Shari’ah is often described as “jurists law,” the 
jurist can only seek to understand and expand applications of 
the law given by God and the Prophet Muhammad who 
comprise the sole legislative body [14].  The jurist states what 
the accepted law is, or should be, on a matter often deciding 
whether something is halal or haram. However when a novel 
issue arises the role of the jurist has best been best described 
as “searching” for the law rather than creating it, and thus a 
new rule is found instead of manufactured [55].   
                                                                                                     
orthodoxy formed around those private scholars who 
distinguished themselves by education, dialectical skill, and 
popularity with students and the public who consulted them. 
Over the years, many schools of law emerged as students 
collected the lectures and legal opinions of influential jurists and 
eventually wrote commentaries upon them. With a sufficient 
number of disciples preserving and expanding the work of a 
particular jurist (and especially when accompanied by popular 
and other external support), that jurist's corpus of opinions and 
accompanying legal methodology became known as a 
„madhhab‟” [46]. 
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The sources the jurists search and find the laws within are 
primarily the Holy Qur‟an, the literal word of God, and the 
Sunnah, which are the sayings (hadith) and actions of the 
Prophet [14]. The Qur‟an and the Sunnah are considered the 
primary sources of the Shari’ah and secondary sources, like 
fiqh manuals, cannot contradict them [14]. The Qur‟an only 
contains roughly 500 verses with legal substance out of the 
6,239 verses that make up it entirety [14].
12
 The normative 
verses discuss a wide range of legal subjects that can be 
broken up into two general categories, ibadat and mu’amalat 
[14]. Ibadat pertains to those actions in the spiritual realm, 
prayer, fasting and so on. Mu’amalat deals with social 
interactions in nature like contracts, wills, and riba [14].  Riba 
is the concept of interest that is explicitly prohibited by God in 
the Qur‟an and is the underlying unlawful (haram) custom that 
Islamic banks seek to avoid [26].  
2) Secondary Sources of Law 
While the Qur‟an offers the basic guidelines many norms 
and rulings in Islamic jurisprudence are based on or explained 
by the Sunnah [14]. The substance of the Sunnah is comprised 
of sayings uttered by the Prophet, and descriptions of his 
conduct by his companions and family [14]. The purpose of 
using the Sunnah is to clarify and expand on the few laws 
provided by the Qur‟an and find rules on legal issues where 
the Qur‟an is silent. In theory the Sunnah cannot contradict the 
Qur‟an for use in legal matters. The same categorizations of 
ibadat and mu’amalat also apply to rules derived from the 
Sunnah. More often then not the Qur‟an and the Sunnah do 
not explicitly state what the law is but rather contain the basis 
for the rule [14]. However, if the law stated in the two primary 
sources is explicitly clear it is absolutely immutable by any 
work of a jurist [11].  Thus secondary sources are used to 
expand, but not contradict, the law contained in the primary 
sources where the jurists search for rules [14].  
Secondary sources of the Shari’ah include: Ijma which is 
a consensus among scholars on a legal issues; Qiya’s which is 
the deduction or induction of a rule by analogy to the Qur‟an 
and the Sunnah; Maslaha, the public good; Urf, customary 
practices; and Istihsan which is defined “as either (1) the 
preference for a recognized source of law over reasoning by 
analogy (qiyas), or (2) the preference for one reasoning by 
analogy over another that is considered weaker” [39]. The two 
most important secondary sources of law for Islamic banking 
are those of fatwas and ijtihad [36].  Ijtihad is the basis for a 
fatwa. Fatwas are the legal opinions of jurists responding to a 
particular legal question posed by a party, often a bank 
manager, seeking guidance on the Shari’ah. More often than 
                                                          
12 The number “500” was given by Imam Al-Ghazali who is one 
of the great Islamic jurists and philosophers, however to the 
average reader of the Quran the number seems high since many 
of the normative verses are repeated or overlap in presenting a 
general rule. Islamic Scholar John L. Esposito put the number of 
normative or “legal” verses in the Qur‟an at 90 [26].   
not, the jurist issuing a fatwa is not affiliated with any State 
institution [12]. It is typically the case that independent jurist 
are seen by the public as more inclined to issue honest ruling 
based on the Shari’ah than their counterpart Qadi’s, who are 
appointed by the state.
13
  
In the case of Islamic banking, a fatwa would be issued by 
a single independent jurist, or group of jurists, who have a 
background on the financial matter [36]. What is, and is not, 
permissible under the Shari’ah in Islamic banking is often 
decided in the form of a fatwa [36]. A jurist may even use a 
predecessor‟s fatwa as a form of precedent if it is on a similar 
issue [14]. Thus a fatwa may work its way into a more 
substantive legal position much like an authoritative case in 
Common Law jurisdiction [30]. In the Islamic Banking 
industry it is commonplace for fatwas to set normative 
standards much like substantive law [37]. However, because 
of regular innovation in the financial market place an issue can 
be complex, new, and outside the realm of prior rulings. When 
this is the case it is likely that the jurist will engage in the 
process of ijtihad.  
3) Ijtihad 
In the simplest sense, ijtihad can be viewed as judicial 
decision-making in the absence of a clear rule within the 
primary and secondary Shari‟ah sources [14]. Ijtihad is the 
process of “searching” for and “finding” the law discussed 
earlier, and is often described as the most difficult task a jurist 
can engage in [55] [28]. Like the scope of interpretation in the 
Common Law, ijtihad can be contrasted and constrained by a 
form of “imitation,” or non-binding precedent called taqlid 
[14] [55]. Taqlid can be viewed as “the solidification of each 
legal school into predictable collections of doctrinal rules… 
with recognized majority and minority rules comprising the 
doctrine of each school…[T]aqlid eventually became so 
entrenched in Islamic jurisprudence that „the text and the 
precedent of each school became the source of legitimacy in 
juristic thinking‟” [47]. 
Ijtihad is often used in fatwas regarding Islamic banking, 
since many of the issues involved with Islamic financial 
products are relatively new and require an expansion of the 
Shari’ah to accommodate or prohibit the action in question 
[36]. It is crucial for the purposes of analyzing judicial 
decision-making in Islamic banking that the process behind 
ijtihad is understood because heavily cited fatwas from 
respected jurists often become substantive law, or fiqh. 
However because “many Islamic countries do not endorse the 
notion of binding precedent…there is some degree of 
uncertainty as to whether a financial method or instrument 
currently considered Shari’ah-compliant will remain so for the 
length of any given project or investment plan” [48]. 
                                                          
13 The public‟s preference for independent jurists and the 
mistrust of State qadi’s is highlighted and discussed in depth in 
two interesting articles: [12] and [10]. 
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Within this vast legal tradition lies a small subset of 
jurists whose ijtihad expands the application of the Shari’ah to 
the modern financial markets. These jurists are highly 
respected although not appointed by a State, and still mostly 
free from government interference as is often the case in 
modern Islamic jurisprudence [12]. These jurists not only 
regulate the banks in accordance with the Shari’ah but help 
shape the Islamic market as a whole. While they do not don 
wigs or robes, or preside over a courtroom, the history of 
Islamic law has shown us that they are indeed jurists who 
create fiqh through the process of ijtihad. In the Western sense 
they can be seen as informal jurists whose scholarly status 
allows them to say what the accepted law is on a matter as 
well as what it should be a new or novel issue. They act as 
private in-house arbitrators mediating the banks profit motives 
and the protective goals of the Shari’ah [23].14 However under 
the Shari’ah they are typically referred to as private jurist and 
are often seen as more credible then their State counter-parts 
because of their distance from the perceived corruption of the 
government [12].
15
  
II. ISLAMIC BANKING FORM AND FUNCTION 
The modern concept of Islamic banking in its 
contemporary institutional form is relatively new in 
comparison to the traditional commercial transactions that 
were Islamic in nature by their abstention from interest or 
overly risky trading.
 16
 Islamic Banking discussed here is 
roughly forty years old, and was created to serve Islamic 
communities investing and savings needs in the Middle East 
and South East Asia [52]. More recently Islamic banks have 
branched out into global investment banking and insurance 
markets with approval from the Jurists paving the way [20]. 
Furthermore, Islamic banking products are now growing in 
popularity in Western nations including the United Kingdom 
and United States [56] [13]. 
A. Prohibitions and Guidelines 
Islamic banking is most widely understood by Western 
financial practitioners as banking without interest (riba) and 
while the abstention of riba is the main concern, all other 
                                                          
14 “It is from this perspective that the Shari'ah supervisory board 
(“SSB”) may be viewed as both an auditor (for the company 
offering the financial service or product) and a consumer 
advocate (for the company's clients)” [23]. 
15 “Thus, all the four founders of the legendary schools of 
jurisprudence demonstrated through their personal life stories 
that Islamic law must be severed from the power of the 
government. Opinio-jurists, and not rulers, are the guardians of 
Islamic law. Opinions delivered in private chambers of honest 
and God-fearing opinio-jurists are more worthy of consideration 
than those issued by government judges or government opinio-
jurists. The inherent mistrust of rulers informs the enterprise of 
Islamic law” [12]. 
16 Like the section before this is merely a brief overview, please 
see [33] for a better understanding of Islamic Banking, contracts 
and financial products. 
things prohibited by the Shari’ah are also impermissible in the 
Islamic banking industry [33].  Therefore it is the opinion of 
those in the industry that the key defining characteristic of 
Islamic banking is the attempt to have a profitable economic 
system built on the principles of morality laid out by the 
Shari’ah [2]. Simply put interest and risky investing are 
prohibited because God has declared them immoral and 
prohibited them [32].
17
 This moral ideal is expressed by 
various financial products and regulated by the jurists who 
balance the duality of profit motives and morality as desire for 
the former can often lead inhibition of the later [34].  
 An Islamic bank, like a Muslim person, is prohibited 
for investing and earning income from things that are 
prohibited under the Shari’ah including: destructive weapons, 
pornography, tobacco, alcohol, gambling, and prohibited 
animal products [33].
18
 Most importantly Islamic banks are 
prohibited from overly risky investing (gharar) or deriving 
profit from financial products that contain interest (riba) like 
mortgage backed securities [52]. This is largely the reason 
Islamic Banks faired well in the recent finical crisis and an 
example of how the Shari’ah functions as a shield rather than 
a wall [48]. 
According to Brian Kettell, a scholar on Islamic finance, 
there are six key principles of Islamic financial products 
designed to maintain the morality required by the Shari’ah, 
they are: 1. The prohibition of predetermined loan repayments; 
2. The encouraged use of profit and loss sharing; 3. The 
prohibition of “making money out of money,” meaning all 
financial transactions must be asset-backed; 4. The prohibition 
of overly speculative investing (gharar); 5. Only Shari’ah 
approved contracts are permissible; 6. Contracts are to be 
made and performed by all parties in good faith as defined by 
the Shari’ah. The basis of these principles can be derived from 
various verses in the Qur‟an and by acts or statements in the 
Sunnah prohibiting interest, gambling, and contracting in bad-
faith [33]. One can also tell that the Islamic fiscal principles 
often generate more risk for the bank than what would 
normally be expected in the secular interest based system 
because of the increased amount of profit-loss sharing [33].  
                                                          
17 2: 275 (Y. Ali) “Those who devour usury will not stand 
except as stand one whom the Evil one by his touch Hath driven 
to madness. That is because they say: "Trade is like usury," but 
Allah hath permitted trade and forbidden usury. Those who after 
receiving direction from their Lord, desist, shall be pardoned for 
the past; their case is for Allah (to judge); but those who repeat 
(The offence) are companions of the Fire: They will abide 
therein (for ever)” [32]. 
2:276 “Allah will deprive usury of all blessing, but will give 
increase for deeds of charity: For He loveth not creatures 
ungrateful and wicked” [32]. 
3:130 “O ye who believe! Devour not usury, doubled and 
multiplied; but fear Allah. That ye may (really) prosper” [32]. 
18 However it is often the cases that bank can invest in 
companies that deal with those products as long as no more then 
five percent of the company‟s revenue is from the prohibited 
products, and such “unlawful” or haram revenue that is received 
by the bank is donated to charity. 
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B. Islamic Financial Innovations 
 
In order to comply with the Shari’ah and the prohibition 
on riba the Islamic financial industry has introduced a variety 
of products founded on the principles above. Some basic 
products include: Murabaha contracts which is a sale of goods 
or real property with a pre-agreed profit mark-up on the cost 
[3];
19
 Mudaraba is a contract made between two parties one of 
whom provides the capital, the other manages the project, the 
profits of which are split at a pre-determined ratio; 
Musharaka, which is joint venture financing, profits and 
losses are shared by the investing parties based on a pre-
agreed ratio and equity respectively; Salam, which is the 
“purchase of a commodity for deferred delivery in exchange 
for immediate payment according to specified conditions or 
sale of a commodity for deferred delivery in exchange for 
immediate payment” [1].  Takaful, which is essentially a 
charity based insurance system deemed halal for not being 
overly speculative [2]. Furthermore, despite the variety of 
contracting options it is estimated Murabaha contracts make 
up eighty percent of Islamic financial transactions [5].  
Although these products may achieve similar goals and have 
similar outcomes when compared to their secular counterparts, 
the mechanisms that produce the profit are Shari’ah complaint 
and reflect the morality imposed by the Shari’ah.  
Take a Murabaha contract for example. If used to 
purchase a house, it serves the same purpose as a mortgage 
and concludes with a similar result yet contains no interest in 
the contract or in the course of dealing. While the outcome 
may appear the same to a Western mortgagor it is the 
mechanics of the Murabaha contract that differ from a 
traditional mortgage and make the contract halal [23]. Under 
Murabaha contract, if Family X wanted to purchase a new 
home they would go to Bank Y which would purchase the 
residence at the specified price and pay, $100,000. Bank Y 
would then re-sell the residence to Family X at an agreed upon 
profit mark-up of $10,000. Family X would pay back Bank Y 
during the course of a number of installments while 
simultaneously purchasing the house from Bank Y. Family X 
would end up paying $110,000 after all the installments were 
paid, and then gain full title in the house. While the Murabaha 
contract described creates a mortgage-like product, jurists 
unanimously agree that this is halal, and riba free, based on 
the principle that the terms and performance of the contract 
creates two sales rather then a sale of money [23]. This is 
based on the principle that God has “permitted trade and 
forbidden riba,” riba essentially being the sale of money now 
for money later [32].
20
  
                                                          
19 “[S]eller informs [a] buyer of the cost at which the seller 
obtained an object of sale [which is to be resold to such buyer] 
and collects a profit margin either as a lump sum, or the seller 
may state the profit margin as a percentage or ratio of the seller's 
original purchase price” [3].  
20 2: 275 “Allah hath permitted trade and forbidden usury. Those 
who after receiving direction from their Lord, desist, shall be 
pardoned for the past; their case is for Allah (to judge); but those 
 
C. Shari’ah Supervisory Boards 
 
The approval of an Islamic financial instrument is two 
fold: first it must be lawful in the jurisdiction that the product 
or contract is being used; and second the product must be 
lawful under the Shari’ah, which in some Islamic countries is 
the only requirement [23]. The judicial decision-making 
governing the second element is made by Shari’ah 
Supervisory Boards (herein after “SSB”). The SSB‟s role is 
“to assure the institutions clients that the business renders 
services in a Shari’ah complaint manner” [37]. An SSB is 
mandatory for any Islamic financial institution [23]. Even 
Western institutions like the Dow Jones Indexes, Citicorp, and 
HSBC now have SSB‟s for Shari’ah-complaint transactions 
and investing [33] [50].
21
  It should be noted however that the 
SSB may give deference to the rulings of other external and 
independent Islamic Institutions, namely the Accounting and 
Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions 
(AAOIFI) [37].
22
  
The primary focus of these boards and organizations is to 
ensure that Islamic financial products and practices are in fact 
Islamic and Shari’ah compliant [37]. “Whenever an Islamic 
corporate institution wishes to structure a financial transaction 
in accordance with Islamic law, the firm will consult either an 
external or internal Shari'ah board. The initial consultation 
typically leads to multiple review sessions followed by 
amendments to the structure and the documentation of the 
agreement after each review, as well as further monitoring and 
consultation after the transaction if necessary” [37]. 
Compliance with other institutions like the AAOIFI is 
normally self-motivated, however seven Islamic jurisdictions, 
including Bahrain, Dubai and Qatar, have adopted the 
AAOIFI‟s financial regulations as law governing banking 
transactions.
23
  
An SSB can be made up of one or more, regularly three, 
jurists [37].
 
They are scholars of Islamic law as well as 
economics and finance [37]. Members of SSB‟s are often, 
academics, former Judges or bank managers.
24
 However 
certain jurisdictions have required the members of SSB have a 
                                                                                                     
who repeat (The offence) are companions of the Fire: They will 
abide therein (forever)” [32]. 
21 Seniawski refers to “Chase, UBS, and Deutsche Bank‟s 
Shari’ah complaint ventures” [50].  
22 The best way for me to describe the AAOIFI or other fiqh 
academies is by comparing them and their work to a similar 
institution in the U.S, namely the American Law Institute 
(A.L.I.) and the Restatements. 
23 AAOIFI has gained assuring support for the implementation 
of its standards, which are now adopted in the Kingdom of 
Bahrain, Dubai International Financial Centre, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Qatar, Sudan and Syria. The relevant authorities in Australia, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and 
South Africa have issued guidelines that are based on AAOIFI‟s 
standards and pronouncements [1]. 
24 Like Sheikh Usmani, mentioned earlier, who was a Supreme 
Court Justice in Pakistan and has held many other prestigious 
judicial positions [53]. 
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minimum of five years experience issuing religious rulings 
[33]. There is also an implied “character and fitness” type 
requirement to ensure that the jurist is mentally competent and 
pious enough to issue religious rulings [36].  
The primary role of the jurists on a SSB is to issue fatwas 
on financial transactions. However despite the presence trade 
standards set by groups like the AAOIFI disagreements can 
occur when the standards fall behind market innovation [23]. 
Take Sheikh Muhammad Taqi Usmani‟s fatwa regarding 
sukuk discussed earlier in this paper; it highlights the idea that 
a jurist can disagree with other jurists on the permissibility of 
a particular product even after it has been deemed permissible 
by a number of other jurists and even popular among investors 
[48]. Naturally investors view the risk caused by legal 
uncertainty negatively [48].  Therefore if a disagreement or 
split among the jurists occurs a bank would subsequently 
follow the law chosen by its SSB.
25
  
Essentially Islamic banking is an exercise in submission. 
The institution submits to the Shari’ah, as does the worshiper, 
the jurists guide the worshipers, and the SSB guides the 
institution. Just like individuals, banks are often confronted 
with questions regarding the lawfulness of a particular act 
under the Shari’ah. This is where the SSB will issue an 
opinion of law, a fatwa, on the matter thereby approving or 
disapproving of the act and subsequently creating a new 
regulation for the Bank to follow in order to remain Shari’ah 
compliant. This decision-making process is the subject of the 
following discussion and the general focus of proposed future 
discourse. 
 
III. JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING IN ISLAMIC BANKING 
 
The questions this discussion seeks to begin answering 
are, how do the jurists on an SSB make their decisions, and 
why do they arrive at their legal conclusions. In answering I 
will test two possible theories used by legal scholars analyzing 
judges in the U.S. court systems. These two methods of 
analyzing judicial decision-making are legalism and the 
economic theory. Despite the “realist” assertion that the 
Islamic banking system is a reaction to Islamic revivalism, and 
that modern fatwas on the issue of finance are promulgating a 
political ideology [6] it is my hypothesis that the legalist and 
economic theories, rather then any attitudinal theory, are the 
most accurate descriptions of the processes used by jurists in 
the Islamic banking industry.  
Essentially, the jurists on SSB rule on the basis of the 
Shari’ah and other influences like global politics are 
secondary. I am not denying the existence of possible political 
motives linked to ideological differences stemming from legal 
education in different schools or regions as research has 
shown that the judicial decision-making process is surrounded 
                                                          
25 The binding authority of an institution‟s SSB is a regulation 
set forth by the AAOIFI, which member banks have agreed to 
follow. The presence of agencies like the AAOIFI or other fiqh 
academies is designed to create consistency among banking 
institutions. 
by numerous influences outside the law [15] [29] [49] [40]. 
However, I will not be discussing attitudinal theories in any 
detail, mainly because the economic theory “overlaps” with 
other strategic, sociological, psychological, pragmatic, and 
organizational theories of judicial decision-making [45].  
Therefore some of the aforementioned theories may be 
touched on impliedly [45]. 
 
A. The Legalist Theory 
 
The legalist method, or legalism, as described by the 
renowned Judge Posner, “hypothesizes that judicial decisions 
are determined by “the law,” conceived of as a body of 
preexisting rules found stated in canonical legal 
materials…[T]he legalist model comes complete with a set of 
rules of interpretation (“canons of construction”) so that 
interpretation too becomes a rule-bound activity” [45]. 
Essentially legalism presumes that the sole, or most 
influential, component of judicial decision-making is the law 
itself. “The ideal legalist decision is the product of a syllogism 
in which the rule of law supplies the major premise, the facts 
of the case supply the minor one, and the decision is the 
conclusion” [45]. This theory of a rule-bound jurists is equally 
applicable to the Islamic legal tradition when a jurist is called 
on to write a fatwa. Although realists and skeptics of Islamic 
finance criticize this formalist approach, I believe the legalist 
method is indicative of a sincere and humble effort by the 
jurist to apply Divine law to modern financial problems rather 
then “legalistic acrobatics” circumventing the goals Shari’ah 
[4] [5].  
Before a jurist can issue a fatwa he must meet a detailed 
set of procedural requirements [36]. The issue presented must 
be a real legal question posed by a party, in this case an 
Islamic bank [36] [42]. The question must be submitted to a 
jurist or jurists, here the SSB, who are familiar with the 
requirement, premise, and legal background of the issue so 
that they may arrive at a conclusion that reflects proper juristic 
form and the modern context of the current event [8]. 
Furthermore if the jurist is on an SSB and the questioner is the 
bank it will be compulsory for the bank to adhere to the 
decision of the fatwa, thus equity is required because of the 
immediate economic effect to the bank [36]. The traditional 
idea of equity has been ever present in the Shari’ah and 
remains a factor in balancing the goals of the Shari’ah and 
financial goals of the bank and its customers [38] [50].  
Finally a matter of healthy body and mind, the jurist should 
avoid issuing a fatwa if he is ill, hungry, thirsty, tired, or if the 
weather is too hot or cold; essentially the jurist should avoid 
issuing a fatwa when any emotional or physical reactions may 
influence the opinion [36]. To most this idea seems like 
common sense. However it is actually a quite meritorious 
regulation, as relevant research on American trial judges have 
shown the affects of the physical state on the soundness of 
judicial decision-making process [24].  After the initial 
procedural requirements are met the decision-making process 
begins. 
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1) The Legalist Theory in the Islamic Tradition 
 
In order to understand the legalist method in any legal 
tradition, one must first understand the accepted forms of 
interpretation in that legal system. Accordingly in Islamic 
jurisprudence each madhhab has a characteristic legal 
methodology, reflecting the schools preferences on the use of 
texts, tradition/customs and independent reasoning [46]. The 
means of interpretation are applied to the two primary sources 
of text, the Qur‟an and the hadith.  
Today there are three primary modes of interpretation in 
Islamic jurisprudence comparable to Common Law traditions 
of statutory interpretation. They are: originalism, based on the 
legal and normative customs of the people city of Medina 
when it was under the leadership of the Prophet; textualism, 
based solely on the text of Qur‟an and authenticated hadith; 
and purposavism or maqasid al Shari’ah, which is ijtihad 
based upon the purposes of the Shari’ah allowing legal 
reasoning to come directly from a general principle so long as 
it supports one or more purposes of the Shari’ah [46].26  
Purposavism allowed Islamic jurists to expand the body 
of fiqh around five necessary divine purposes: religion, life, 
mind, family, or property [46] [28]. The use of maqasid al-
Shari'ah became universally accepted after being advocated as 
a theory of interpretation by the renowned jurist Al-Ghazali 
[46]. It was seen as a middle ground between strict textualism 
and the perceived misuse of maslaha used by the Shafi and 
Maliki jurists respectively [46].
27
 “The interpretive 
approaches… show that Islamic law does not permit only one 
interpretation in any given matter... [b]ut rather, depending on 
whether a scholar adopts a strict or literal approach to 
interpretation or a purposive or contextual approach to 
interpretation in exercising ijtihad, different yet acceptable 
solutions to legal problems are quite possible” [28]. 
Therefore if the text of the primary sources is ambiguous, 
a jurist on SSB has generally two approaches under the 
legalist theory. First he can adopt and support prior rulings on 
the issue. Or second, if the prior works of jurist are 
inapplicable, split, or incorrect he can engage in ijtihad using 
the methods of interpretation above and find the rule on his 
own. If the jurist chooses the latter, the legalistic steps guiding 
ijtihad have been succinctly laid out by Shari’ah scholar 
Bernard Weiss in, Interpretation in Islamic Law: The Theory 
of Ijtihad, and can be broken down as follows. 
First the jurist must assess the reliability of text from 
which he intends to derive a rule; if the text is from the Qur‟an 
it is reliable [55]. If he is interpreting hadith assessing 
                                                          
26 It should also be noted that in the earlier days of Islamic 
jurisprudence the Zahiri school used a strict 
constructionist/literalist approach. This approach did not leave 
room for ijtihad and was widely (and in my opinion unfairly) 
criticized by the other schools and has thus disappeared.  
27 “Shafi'i operated on the premise that the textual materials at 
hand provided jurists with a full package of the original precepts 
of the supreme Law. But the early Malikis rejected this text-
comprehensivist paradigm. Malikis have insisted on using non-
textual evidence in the interpretive enterprise” [46]. 
reliability is more complicated because the jurist must analyze 
the chain of narration.
28
 After reliability has been accepted he 
can began interpretation consisting of two tasks: first, the 
linguistic task, where the jurist determines the meaning of the 
words in the text; and second, the jurist must interpret the 
words in their proper context [55]. In doing so he may 
compare the text with other texts or look at the overall purpose 
of the text [55]. After interpreting the text the jurist “may also 
wish to ferret out implications, allusions, nuances, analogical 
deductions and elliptical elements which he believes to be part 
of the broader meaning of the Law” [55]. Finally after the 
jurist has formulated an opinion, he must ensure that the text 
used in forming the opinion has not been abrogated [55]. 
 
2) The Legalist Method in Practice: A Case Study  
 
In order to explain the legalist method as applied in 
Islamic banking I will illustrate the method by using a fatwa 
issued by the SSB of the Kuwait Finance House [22].
29
 The 
question posed by the bank‟s management was, “What is the 
riba that is prohibited by the Qur‟an?” [22]. The question, 
albeit simple in structure, is of the utmost importance as it 
seeks to create a distinction between types of riba, therefore 
allowing the bank to charge a type of interest. Using the 
legalist method the jurist aptly answers the question in the 
fatwa below, concluding that there is only one type of riba and 
it is prohibited.   
The fatwa begins by citing to the primary sources of the 
Shari’ah, the Qur‟an and the Sunnah. First the jurist explains, 
“All the verses [in the Qur‟an] in which riba is mentioned are 
unqualified, such that they do not differentiate between one 
form of riba and another. Therefore recourse must be had, in 
interpreting their meanings, to the commonly accepted legal 
meaning that was derived from the collectivity of verses and 
hadith texts on the subject” [22].  
Then based on the sources the jurist goes on to define riba 
as the “excess for which no compensation is given in the 
contract” including “both riba for consumption and riba for 
planting (investment)” [22]. He further explains riba by 
shedding light on a trade done by a companion of the Prophet. 
However he subsequently excludes the use of the type of 
transaction by explaining the Prophet‟s disapproval of the 
transaction by other companions and supporting with a hadith 
condemning the practice. The hadith states “Gold may be 
exchanged for gold, but only in like quantities, and only hand 
to hand. Any excess will be riba…” The hadith continues with 
the same statement made repetitively however referring to the 
trade of silver, wheat, and dates in a like manner [22]. The 
fatwa continues to explain a disagreement in interpretation of 
                                                          
28 Despite a detailed science of studying hadith, chains or 
narration, and ways of measuring reliability, less reliable hadith 
are often used in ijitihad to the dismay of many Islamic jurists 
[17]. 
29 This fatwa was collected and translated by Shayk DeLorenzo 
from the Kuwait Finance House, al Fatawa al Shari‟yah, 
Question 416, p. 402. 
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the hadith above between jurists
30
 who interpret the hadith 
literally (as in only applying to the commodities mentioned, 
gold, silver, etc.) and other jurists interpreting it based on the 
purpose of the statement (therefore applying prohibition to 
other commodities traded in a similar manner).  
The fatwa then states that “the great majority of jurists, 
however held that the prohibition [of the hadith] extended 
further” and that detail of their arguments “may be found in 
the classical manuals of fiqh” [22]. The jurist then goes on to 
swear by his “life” that those jurist‟s who differentiate 
between types of riba, thereby allowing some forms of 
interest, have committed “a lie against Allah and his Prophet!” 
and that theirs is a “personal opinion with no basis in truth, 
and nothing even resembling a basis!” [22].  
The fatwa continues with a purposevist argument 
suggesting that the prohibition of interest creates other 
avenues of investing such a murabaha contracts [22]. He then 
cites a hadith admonishing those who engage in interest-based 
transactions and includes the chain of narration to validate its 
authenticity [22]. Finally the fatwa concludes with the 
statement “All of the above, in support of the lender and 
borrower, goes to prove the care of Islam in its legislation” 
[22]. 
This fatwa is an example of the legalist method, in that it 
begins with primary sources and works its way through the 
secondary sources as well as the rules of interpretation and 
concludes favoring taqlid rather then ijtihad by openly 
agreeing the majority opinion on legal issue.
 31
 The Scalia-like 
pathos rebuking those who misinterpret the sacred text is an 
added rhetorical touch to show the severity of the jurist‟s 
conviction in his method and possibly an attempt to persuade 
jurist‟s who deviate from the strict unqualified definition of 
riba [27]. 
The jurist in this instance did not engage in in-depth 
ijtihad. He argued there was sufficient evidence in the Qur‟an 
and the Sunnah to conclude that a clear rule existed and that 
making a distinction to that rule would improper interpretation 
of the Divine legislation. Furthermore, the discussion of 
differences in the opinions of fiqh by the schools as well as the 
differences in interpretation show a desire to choose between 
precedents (taqlid) rather then search for the rule 
independently within the primary sources of the Shari’ah. The 
jurist ultimately arrives at his conclusion by citing the 
“majority of jurists” and implying a purposevist approach to 
interpretation of the primary sources while simultaneously 
justifying it through taqlid [22].  
The choice of between the two interpretations can be 
described as the true decision that requires critical analysis. 
The jurist could have adopted either of the approaches and the 
decision would have remained valid. Essentially the jurist 
                                                          
30 Referring to Hanbali jurists and a subset of Hanafi. The group 
of Hanafi mentioned here are the minority view on the issue and 
reach the conclusion through a literal interpretation. 
31 The fatwa refers to ijma when mentioning the consensus of 
the majority of jurists, and refers to the qiyas, or analogy, in the 
purposivist argument of how the hadith applies to other 
commodities outside the one listed in the statement itself.  
could have found a distinction in the definition of riba thereby 
allowing the bank to use a “permissible” form of interest and 
derive profit from it. However keeping in principle with the 
legalist approach, and perhaps contrary to the banks wishes, 
the jurist adopted the majority approach because it has greater 
textual support in the primary sources of the Shari’ah and the 
substantive works of fiqh. He further condemns the minority 
approach allowing types of interest as “a lie” on the basis that 
it lacks any textual evidence in reaching its conclusion.  This 
fatwa demonstrates the immutability of the Shari’ah sources 
and the prohibition on interest. The use of purposivism in the 
fatwa is inherently legalistic in Islamic jurisprudence 
(although often viewed by textualists as a front for “judicial 
activism” in the Common Law) as the jurist justifies his rigid 
interpretation by highlighting the success or murabaha 
contracts [28].  
An interesting point of discussion, in that the fatwa does 
not end with the usual statement “Allah knows best,” as is 
typical in fatwas [47],
 
 but rather it ends with statement, “All 
of the above, in support of the lender and borrower, goes to 
prove the care of Islam in its legislation” [22. This statement 
further emphasizes the legalistic approach chosen by the jurist 
in that the fatwa’s conclusion is supported by “Islam and its 
legislation,” the Qur‟an and the Sunnah. The statement implies 
that the jurist found the texts so clear that it leaves no room for 
the alternative opinions. On the other hand, the customary 
“Allah knows best,” signing statement at the end of a fatwa is 
used to show the fallibility of the jurist in his interpretation; 
the possibility that the competing view may in fact be correct, 
and that, in fact, only Allah does know the true answer to the 
legal question [47].  The signing statement is indicative of the 
pluralistic nature of Islamic jurisprudence and the possibility 
of multiple yet equally valid opinions on a point of law [47].
32
  
 
3) Analysis of the Legalist Method 
 
It is my belief that the majority judicial opinions issued by 
SSB‟s are decided under a legalist theory. For the most part 
the Shari’ah and works of fiqh offer some text or foundation 
to guide the jurists decision-making process leaving less room 
for outside influence. However this formalistic approach has 
been attacked by legal realists as leading overly formalistic 
ends that ignore desired functional purposes of the Shari’ah 
like social justice [4] [25]. While there may be some merit to 
the claim from a purposivist perspective, I believe that as 
formalistic end is a product of legalism, and legalism is itself 
product of piety, rather then a means of circumventing the 
Shari’ah for profit.  
Yet even when the Shari’ah sources are clear the may 
have options in choosing between minority and majority 
approaches. As highlighted in the previous fatwa the jurist 
could have opted for a minority approach that would have 
                                                          
32 Perhaps jurist here the jurist is unabashedly stating that the 
competing views are absolutely false and without merit. This 
issue of fallibility will be discussed further in the economic 
theory portion of the paper as it relates to possible motivations. 
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eased restrictions on the bank yet did not. The choice the jurist 
made, although primarily legalistic, may also have been 
influenced by secondary elements outside the text like money-
income and piety. The weight the jurist places on these 
secondary influences can best be hypothesized using the 
economic theory as laid out by Judge Posner in How Judges 
Think. 
 
B. The Economic Theory 
 
In Posner‟s seminal piece What do Judge’s and Justice’s 
Maximize?…, he concludes by suggesting that his economic 
theory of judicial decision-making should also be applied to 
“elected judges, to Continental European judges, to jurors, and 
to legislators” [44]. Answering Judge Posner‟s call for the re-
application his theory I suggest that it may also be applicable 
to the jurists on the Shari’ah Supervisory Board of an Islamic 
financial institution because despite the corporate nature of an 
SSB, “nonpecuniary income” is a large part of the jurists‟ total 
compensation [44]. Thus I will put forward similar hypotheses 
that Judge Posner and others have applied to U.S. Federal 
judges and re-apply them to the jurists of a SSB. In doing so I 
will look at possible variations or additional hypotheses that 
apply to economic analysis of judicial decision-making in 
Islamic banking.  
The economic theory of judicial decision-making is 
premised on the idea that jurists, like everyone else, are 
rational, self-interested, and seek to maximize their utility 
[45]. The economic elements of the judicial utility function 
include, “money income, leisure, power, prestige, reputation, 
self-respect, intrinsic pleasure of the work…” [45]  and in the 
SSB‟s case, piety. Furthermore these elements can be 
manipulated by the employer thus modifying the behavior of 
the job-holder [45].  
Because of the uniquely religious/corporate position of 
the jurists on the SSB I believe these elements are weighed 
differently then the state-appointed jurists that Posner‟s theory 
was originally applied to. First the employer‟s ability to 
manipulate behavior is greater in a private company, like a 
bank, then a federal judgeship with life tenure and a fixed 
income. Second the jurist behavior can be viewed as having 
two manipulators, God and the bank.
 33
 The jurist can forward 
or hinder the banks financial goals and conversely the bank 
can reward or punish the jurist [7]. Likewise the jurist can 
                                                          
33 While the idea of God as a manipulator may raise some 
eyebrows, I do not intend to take God‟s name in vain. I say it 
only figuratively as means of properly applying the economic 
model to the jurist. God‟s role can be seen as an manipulator as 
God has the ability to modify constrain and motivate behaviors 
of the believer even if such modification is at odds with the 
employer. God is “Al Mughnî” (the “Enricher”) “Ar Razzâq” 
(“the Provider”), “Al Mughîth” (“the Sustainer”).  Because there 
are two manipulators a religious duty may come into conflict 
with secular work duty. For example a Muslim‟s religious duty 
to fast during Ramadan and her duty to work swiftly at her job 
may conflict. Whether she fasts or not depends on which reward 
she desires and modifies her behavior for. 
forward or hinder the goals of the Shari’ah and God can 
reward or punish the jurist. While profit and the goals the 
Shari’ah are by no means mutually exclusive, the line at 
which profit becomes unlawful is defined by the Shari’ah and 
thus an inevitable conflict will occur as the lines between 
halal and haram drawn.  
For the purposes of analysis I have assumed the jurists are 
more motivated to avoid punishment from God then the bank. 
I also believe that piety is an additional element functioning as 
both a motivator and constraint in its interactions with the 
other elements influencing the judicial decision-making 
process. Although piety is not mentioned in Posner‟s theory, 
no economic analysis of the Islamic jurist would be sufficient 
without discussing an element that has value in life and after 
death.  Furthermore in putting forth these hypotheses the 
elements will overlap with one another in forming a general 
economic theory of judicial decision-making in Islamic 
banking as it is possible for a jurist to be motivated by 
multiple elements at once.  
Finally, without empirical research it is difficult to 
validate these theories. The goal here is to simply approach 
this unique form of judicial decision-making as I believe 
Judge Posner would. While I am cognizant of possible errors 
in the economic analysis, they are due in part to limited 
material on the subject and the theoretical nature of 
economics. As Posner described, “…the heart of economic 
analysis of law is a mystery that is also an embarrassment: 
how to explain judicial behavior in economic terms…” [44]. 
And while the SSB is not totally “divorced” from obvious 
economic incentives like compensation, the dual nature of the 
SSB makes the value placed on these incentives ambiguous in 
comparison to the other nonpecuniary-income [44]. 
 
1) Money Income 
 
 The first and most obvious possible influence on the 
judicial decision-making process is money-income [7]. Here 
Posner would hypothesize that the influence of money-income 
is greater for the jurist on the SSB because, unlike federal 
judges, the jurists of an SSB do not have a permanently fixed 
income or similar job security. However despite the SSB‟s 
corporate role and the popularity of modern cynicisms view of 
organized religion, I believe the motivation for and influence 
of money-income is outweighed by the preference for the 
other nonpecuniary elements, like piety.  
Money-income for the jurist and money-income for the 
institution are firmly related. Each party, the bank and the 
SSB, has the ability increase or limit the other‟s money-
income [7]. Therefore the SSB and the institution are required 
to function symbiotically and not competitively as strained 
relations between the two parties will likely decrease the 
money-income earned by each party. If the jurists prohibit too 
many transactions or contracts the bank will have less revenue 
to pay the jurists, or more may terminate and replace them 
with other jurists who the banks perceives as more equitable to 
the banks financial needs. On the other hand if the jurist gives 
way to the banks money-income motivation and adopts the 
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motivation as his own he might be setting aside the Shari’ah at 
the expense of other elements. If the latter is the case the jurist 
may be gaining money-income and lose piety or prestige both 
of which may be seen as having greater value in the long term. 
What is more likely is that if a jurist declares a transaction 
impermissible the SSB will subsequently assist the bank in 
finding a Shari’ah compliant solution. Thus equity may 
require that a jurist function more like an arbitrator and less 
like clerk with a halal stamp of approval. 
Therefore, the likelihood the jurist will appease a bank 
and deem the impermissible halal is small because the other 
competing elements (prestige, piety, reputation etc.) combined 
and the jurists desire to secure a pleasurable afterlife will 
outweigh the motivation for money-income. However, 
leniency is also an accepted legalistic concept based in Islamic 
law‟s view of equity as established under the legalist method 
as a maxim or “golden rule.” The maxim creates the legal 
presumption that everything is permissible except what is 
explicitly forbidden by the Shari’ah [20] [3]. This 
presumption is what I call the “presumption of permissibility,” 
and it is prominent in Islamic banking [2]. This presumption 
encourages judicial restraint before prohibiting transactions, 
because unless the basis of the transaction is clearly prohibited 
by the primary sources it will be allowed. The point of 
mentioning this legal presumption is to re-affirm the idea that 
even if the jurist appears lenient it is still likely adherence to 
the Shari’ah and its legal presumptions motivating the ruling 
rather then money-income [20].  
 
2) Prestige 
 
 Because of the highly privatized nature of Islamic 
jurisprudence prestige should to be quite important to Islamic 
jurists [12]. In a sense, prestige would help the jurist develop a 
following of believers who rely on the jurist‟s rulings for 
guidance [12]. Thus prestige may increase the jurist‟s power 
and therefore the jurist can subsequently achieve other more 
ideological or political goals once a following is secured [12]. 
However the span of prestige appears limited, as fatwas 
regarding financial transactions and contracts reach a limited 
audience of interested individuals. Therefore the ability of a 
jurist on a SSB to gain a significant religious following is 
muddled by the complex and profane nature of financial 
transactions and their governing law.  Consequently it is more 
likely the jurist would be motivated to obtain prestige within 
his particular institution or the Islamic banking industry rather 
than for any grand political ambitions.  
Prestige is distinct from popularity because one who 
motivated by popularity wants to be “liked” by his peers, 
where as someone who is seeking prestige wants to be 
respected [44]. For example, if one of the jurists on an SSB is 
seen as a “yes-man” he may win friends among some of the 
bank managers but he is unlikely to gain any prestige amongst 
fellow jurist or scholars of Islamic law. Similarly, if a jurist is 
perceived as having a preference for money-income it may 
lead to criticism from more respected scholars and a loss of 
prestige as highlighted by the two fatwas cited earlier in the 
paper. The loss prestige of would limit the precedential power 
of his fatwas and may subsequently bar them from entering a 
position of substantive law. Therefore a jurist may be 
motivated to uphold the principles of the Shari’ah against 
money-income in order to maintain his prestige.  
In the alternative a jurist who is perceived as more lenient 
may gain favor among the bank managers of other institutions 
opening the door to possible memberships on other SSB‟s. 
However this is not prestige, and is something more akin to 
popularity as it likely to garner little respect from other jurists 
or academics. While popularity may play some role as an 
element here, I believe the desire to be popular in private 
sector differs in its former application to federal judges 
because of popularities close relation to money-income in 
commercial settings. Essentially, if a jurist desires to earn a 
reputation as being exceedingly lenient and “liked” for his 
leniency, his desire for popularity may be motivated by 
money-income rather than the desire to win friends among 
bankers.  
Furthermore the jurist‟s prestige is important for the bank. 
Because the bank seeks religious clientele the prestige of the 
jurists on its SSB arguably serves as a marketing tool [37].  
One can assume that more prestigious the members of the 
SSB, the more Shari’ah-compliant and trustworthy the 
institution will appear to religious account holders, investors, 
and partners. Therefore if the jurists are seen as profit 
motivated “yes-men,” than groups of the religious public, 
potential investors, will become more skeptical of the Islamic 
banking system than they already are [4]. Because prestige is 
important to both the jurist and the bank it is likely the jurist 
will be given more deference by the bank when developing a 
product or issuing a fatwa, thereby increasing the jurist‟s 
prestige among other members of the Islamic banking industry 
and subsequently protecting himself from the criticism of 
other jurists and academics.  
 
3) Power 
 
 Like prestige, a jurist‟s power or the lack thereof, in 
and outside an institution may motivate his rulings. However 
unlike a more public jurist, fatwas issued by an SSB garner 
less attention because the are directed at a very specific 
audience. Thus the concept of a “power trip” may be more 
popular among federal judges or qadi’s and is less likely to 
occur in the private domain of an SSB [44].
34
 However this 
does not mean jurists who specialize in banking are less 
motivated to gain power, but rather that power, like the other 
elements, is valued and manipulated differently. For the 
purposes of economic analysis there are two types of power 
that may motivate a ruling: power outside the institution, and 
power within the institution.  
                                                          
34 A “power trip” is when the judge attempts to “change the 
world” through a ruling. Because the judicial decision made by 
the jurists on an SSB in are tailored to a very specific questioner 
and are generally in reference to a financial transaction there is 
unlikely a greater policy motives influencing the decision-
making process. 
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First power outside the institution, the less influential of 
the two. In highlighting the role power outside the institution I 
will focus Sheikh Usmani‟s fatwa regarding sukuk discussed 
early in the paper. Sheikh Usmani has acquired prestige and is 
a heavily cited authority in the world of Islamic banking [48]. 
Because of this prestige he also has a sufficient amount of 
power outside his respective institution such that he can 
influence the Islamic market place with a single fatwa [48].
35
 
While it is unlikely that the Sheikh‟s fatwa regarding sukuk 
was motivated by a self-interest in maximizing this power it is 
clear that he has gained authority in the industry and such 
authority may be a desirable form of nonpecuniary-income to 
other jurists. We can assume, however, that if a similar fatwa 
regarding sukuk were issued by a less-prestigious jurist, it 
would have had less influence outside the institution in the 
“free market” of Islamic jurisprudence [12] [28]. Therefore we 
can further hypothesize that if such power outside a jurist‟s 
respective institution is desirable a jurist may be motivated to 
attain more prestige and power so their fatwas’ receive 
recognition and gain wider influence.  
The effect to which the desire to maximize this type of 
power functions as a motivator for Islamic jurists is arguable.  
Essentially the question is to what extent do less powerful 
jurists of an SSB want the same amount of power as someone 
like Sheikh Usmani. In answering the question, I believe the 
jurists are pious such that the desire for power outside the 
institution would be secondary when issuing a ruling as the 
key goal is to uphold the Divine law, rather then increase the 
jurist‟s fortitude in the financial world. In a sense piety 
requires humbleness, and a humble jurist cannot, or should 
not, be motivated by power when interpreting God‟s law. Thus 
the jurists‟ motivation for power outside the institution is 
limited.  
 However the second type of power, power inside the 
institution is likely to play a greater role in the judicial 
decision-making process. Because of the fatwa’s non-binding 
nature in the “free-market” of Islamic law, as well as the 
accepted fallibility and pluralism of ijtihad, the jurist‟s power 
is most often limited to the institution that has posed the 
question [37] [28]. Therefore it is more likely that the jurist is 
motivated to maintain enough power in his institution so that 
his position on the SSB remains a relevant and authoritative. 
Thus power within an institution is more influential and may 
motivate a jurist to prohibit a transaction so that the institution 
will continue seek approval of a reformed version of that 
transaction. Because the prohibition forces the bank and the 
SSB to seek a compromise later, the prohibition temporarily 
increases the jurist‟s power within the institution during the 
latter advisory period.  
On the other hand, if the jurist outright approves of a 
transaction his work is complete in regards to that transaction 
and power within the institution is less relevant. Conclusively, 
a jurist may be motivated at times to prohibit transactions in 
order to gain power within the institution rather then power 
outside the institution. This type of power is desirable simply 
                                                          
35 In this regard, Robbins cites [54]. 
for the reason that people may enjoy more authoritative 
positions in the workplace as it increases ones self-worth.  Yet 
because the desire for power is constrained by a jurists 
preference to be pious I believe the power element is limited 
in its influence. Finally a Posnerian argument against the idea 
that a jurist has motivation to prohibit a transaction in order to 
increase power within the institution may be that increased 
power would subsequently decrease the jurist‟s leisure time. 
 
4) Leisure 
 
Under the economic model of judicial decision-making 
leisure is a form of nonpecuniary income, and an increase in 
leisure would decrease pecuniary income [44]. According to 
Posner the leisure preference may be the reason federal judges 
place so much emphasis on judicial economy [45]. Likewise a 
jurist on SSB might also approve a transaction or contract for 
the leisure time it would create after because the approval 
process would end and there would be little or no need for any 
follow up meetings or review.  
Like the federal judges Posner analyzed, Islamic jurists 
may also like a bit of down time, therefore issuing shorter 
fatwas or deeming a product or transaction permissible may be 
motivated by the desire to increase judicial efficiency and 
possibly leisure time. Understandably, the more power the 
jurist is afforded the more responsibility he would have, and 
subsequently less leisure time would be available to him. 
Therefore we can also assume that the motivation for power 
and the motivation for leisure are normally at odds with one 
another in the judicial decision-making process. Thus one may 
contrast the motivation for power to prohibit a transaction, 
with the motivation for leisure time and the approval of a 
transaction or issue a shorter fatwa.  
Yet the hypothesis regarding leisure time and short fatwas 
may be more correlative than anything indicative as a leisure 
preference in the SSB. Rather issuing shorter fatwas may be 
an indicator of the legalist method as issuing shorter fatwas is 
recommended and has historically been practiced in Islamic 
jurisprudence [36]. Therefore a series of short fatwas may be 
more consistent with the legalist method.  However this does 
not rule out the motivation to approve a contract or transaction 
in order to increase leisure time afterwords. Conclusively a 
leisure preference may motivate a jurist to approve 
transactions but the leisure preference is constrained by the 
preference for money-income, power, and piety.  
 
5) Piety 
 
 Piety is the final and most valued element to be 
discussed. Although not addressed by Posner, I am positive of 
piety‟s role as both a motivator and constraint in religious 
jurisprudence. For purpose of this section piety will be defined 
the modification of acts according to one‟s conscious fear of 
God, the Day of Judgment, and the hereafter. Piety is likely to 
motivate the religious jurists behavior even if it is directly at 
odds with other pecuniary interests. Above all the other 
elements in the economic model, I believe piety has the 
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greatest influence in the Islamic jurist decision-making 
process.  
Like the other elements in Posner‟s theory, piety does 
have an economic value in this world, yet it is distinct because 
the full value of a piety preference is not recognized until after 
death. The value of piety in this world is the value of piety in 
one‟s reputation and ones intrinsic value of themselves. Thus a 
religious jurist is more likely to value himself and his work if 
his work is motivated by a piety preference. For this reason 
the element of piety encompasses Posner‟s elements of 
reputation, self-respect, and intrinsic pleasure of the work 
[45]. 
Piety also has extrinsic economic and commercial value. 
Ideally a jurist of religious law would like to be known for his 
piety above all other characteristics.  Piety is what makes the 
jurist credible to his questioner and motivates the questioner to 
ask that jurist in particular [12]. Piety is a necessary trait 
because it suggests that the jurist worthy of stating Divine law 
and that his opinion is worthy of being followed [12]. In this 
way, piety functions like reputation, yet contains the added 
benefit of increasing ones credibility and character for 
truthfulness.  
Furthermore, the ultimate goal of all Muslims is to attain 
paradise in the hereafter, the acts one commits have a value 
after death. Because a Muslim is judged by the totality of his 
deeds, any bad deed will have a lasting effect that will greatly 
outweigh any temporal economic gain achieved in this world 
[32].
36
 Therefore if a Muslim jurist strives to be pious, any 
ruling that is intentionally misleading presented under the 
guise of piety could have grave consequences in the next life 
where this world‟s money-income has no value.  
 Thus piety motivates the jurist to be honest, to uphold 
the Shari’ah, and to avoid hypocrisy, something viewed 
harshly in Islamic theology [32].
37
 Most importantly, piety 
constrains urges motivated by money-income, power, and 
prestige, so that they become sinful temptations rather then 
economic motivators. It is my belief that piety‟s presence as 
an element minimizes the value the jurist places on the other 
elements and motivates the jurist to adhere to the legalist 
method because legalism limits the jurist‟s spiritual liability 
and insulates the judicial decision-making process from 
impropriety. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
                                                          
36 11:15-16 “Those who desire the life of the present and its 
glitter,- to them we shall pay (the price of) their deeds therein,- 
without diminution. They are those for whom there is nothing in 
the Hereafter but the Fire: vain are the designs they frame 
therein, and of no effect and the deeds that they do!” [32]. 
37 4:142, 145 “The hypocrites - they think they are over-reaching 
Allah, but He will over- reach them: When they stand up to 
prayer, they stand without earnestness, to be seen of men, but 
little do they hold Allah in remembrance…The hypocrites will 
be in the lowest depths of the Fire: no helper wilt thou find for 
them…” [32]. 
Because of the influence of piety described in the prior 
section, I believe the legalist theory is the best method of 
understanding judicial decision-making of the jurists on an 
SSB. Although this conclusion may appear circular, it is not. It 
follows logically that if the jurist is motivated by piety he 
conforms to the legalist method in an attempt to limit his 
liability before God. If the jurist deviates from the legalist 
methods there is the possibility of transgression, and because 
legalism limits opportunities to deviate it provides the safest 
path of judicial decision-making. Thus the preference for piety 
makes legalism a more attractive means of decision-making. 
This conclusion is supported by research conducted on federal 
judges indicating that where the law is clear legalism is used 
and rulings are consistent [21]. Here I believe the Shari’ah and 
subsequent works of fiqh are generally clear such that the 
jurist is rightly guided by the texts. 
 Therefore, I fundamentally disagree with the idea that the 
formality of legalism is being misused for Capitalist purposes. 
Piety restricts the jurist to his texts and canons of 
interpretation; anything outside the Shari’ah sources would 
“taint” the opinion, an opinion that by its nature is intended to 
be an expression of God‟s law [12]. A pious jurist is aware of 
these temptations and adheres to the Shari’ah by avoiding 
them through legalism. The Shari’ah is not only the law 
dictated by the jurist, but the Shari’ah dictates the jurist‟s 
behavior including decision-making process. The Shari’ah is 
holistic, all acts, including judicial decision-making are 
subject to legal categorization, and often sorted by the intent 
of the actor. Because Allah is the ultimate enforcer of the 
Shari’ah any intentionally misleading opinions are subject to 
judgment on the final day. As the famous hadith states “The 
one who performs ijtihad and reaches the right answer will 
receive two rewards [from God], and the one who performs 
ijtihad and reaches the wrong answer will receive one reward 
[from God]” [46].38  The caveat is that the ijtihad must be 
performed sincerely. Again, it is the intent of the jurist that 
matters. Therefore one can assume that feigning the use of 
ijtihad in order to promote impermissible acts would be 
punished in the hereafter.  
Thus legalism and its formalistic nature provide a safe 
avenue of judicial decision-making that is the process most 
often used among the jurists of an SSB. Does the all-
encompassing nature of the Shari’ah protect itself from 
intentional misinterpretation motivated by economic or 
political gains? I believe ideally yes, it should. However this 
presumes private jurists and legal scholars have behaved in 
accordance with the Divine law when issuing rulings 
throughout history, and there is evidence to suggest that this 
was not always the case [12].
39
 
Therefore the question becomes whether or not modern 
Islamic jurisprudence should become subject to the same 
critiques of legal realism that is now prevalent in the U.S. 
                                                          
38 In this regard, Quraishi cites [43]. 
39 Ali Khan discusses the charges made by orientalist Joseph 
Schacht that Islamic law had fraudulently copied earlier Judeo-
Christian and Grecian legal traditions.  
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legal system. However unlike questions posed in the U.S. as to 
whether or not judges are or should be influenced by religious 
belief, the question here is whether or not Islamic judges are 
influenced by anything other than religious belief [19].  
Although other scholars have attacked the sincerity of the 
Islamic banking industry‟s attempt to uphold the Shari’ah, 
their claims are overly cynical and improper as they lack any 
empirical data to support them. Thus a solution to this 
disagreement necessarily calls for the type of empirical 
research used to probe the minds of federal judges [15]. 
Moreover, would such a critical analysis help or reshape 
our understanding of fiqh? Would it create a rise demand for 
the now dead school of literalism (Zahiri madhhab) as a 
means of insulating the Shari’ah from outside influence 
[46]?
40
 Would realism create the same cynicism and 
skepticism now confronting the U.S. judiciary? There are two 
short answers. First, if one thinks the psychological and social-
science based approaches to understanding judicial decision-
making have been successful or beneficial in promoting 
justice in the court system then perhaps it could be helpful to 
the Islamic legal realm. On the other hand if one thinks these 
forms of legal realism have subjected the judiciary to 
unwarranted criticism of being political actors then perhaps 
now is not the best time to critically analyze Islamic jurists. 
Essentially, the question is should the idea of an objective and 
pious Islamic jurist as described in this paper be forever 
tarnished by legal realism and critical legal studies, as the 
ideal of the objective U.S. judge was “slain” and “killed 
again” by legal realists and critically legal studies [19]?  
I leave the answers to these questions up to the jurists 
themselves and all those passionate about Islamic law and 
finance. After the most recent financial crisis it has become 
apparent that market integrity is needed. In many cases 
Islamic finance provides solutions that will help restore 
market integrity. In the Islamic financial institution integrity 
rests with the Shari‟ah board and its jurists. Therefore, in my 
opinion the study of their decision making process is needed 
to maintaining the integrity of Shari‟ah compliance. However, 
in the end the most sincere answer always is “Allah knows 
best.” 
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